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By Marianne F Adnaticol
I. Introduction
The surge of increasing environmental responsibil-
ity has triggered significant changes in the nation's
policy toward our environment- Environmental legisla-
tion inspired by the 1970s national effort to improve
our environment brought some substantial improve-
ments to the state of our environment.' The end-of-
process control and treatment typical of the legisla-
tion, however, failed to bring the expected improve-
ments.2 Mere compliance with existing environmental
legislation now appears to be at a point of diminishing
returns.3 Thus, the proverbial crossroads at which envi-
ronmental law now finds itself calls for a "reinvention
of regulation" that strives for environmental excel-
lence.
The reinvention of regulation places foremost
importance on two particular objectives pollution pre-
vention and environmental justice.4 A pollution pre-
vention policy coupled with an environmental justice
movement that is premised on empowerment through
access to information will play a critical role in carry-
ing out the goal of environmental excellence.
With respect to the first objective. Congress
passed the Pollution Prevention Act,? signifying a shift
in focus to pollution prevention The Act demon-
strates Congress' objective that pollution prevention
through source reduction be the preferred approach
over end-of-process control and treatment 6 The Act
requires the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to affirmatively execute a strategy that
' I D 1999, University of California, Hastings College of the
Law. BA 1995, University of California Los Angeles Special
thanks to Professor Naomi Roht-Arrcaza and Sanford Lewis for the; r
guidance and instruction Also I would like to express my greatest
appreciation to my family, friends and Michael R E Minguet for
their unconditional love and support
I Barry Commoner discusses the shortfalls of our nations
environmental laws in his article Failure of the Environmental Effort, IS
Envtl. L Rep (Envtl L Inst) 10,195 llune 1988)
2 See RosEri V PEO';-ZA _FT .. E. :tL.u RtzliLAx-j-
La," SCIENCE, MND POLDV 13612d ed 19961
3 See Joe Cascio,. Acceptance of iSO 14000 in the USA, SB79
AL] -ABA Cc.%t7u~,zo LEokf. Ecu: 285, 288 119971
4 See Carol M Browner, Stalement of Clinton Administrations First
100 Days, E.'TL NEw' April 28 1993, avadable in 1993 WL 148733
(EPA)
5 Pollution Prevention Act of 1990, 42 USC 13,101(bi
(1994)
6 See id
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promotes pollution prevention. 7 Responding
to this mandate, the EPA implemented the
Pollution Prevention Strategy.8 Through this
strategy, the EPA intends "to incorporate pol-
lution prevention into [the] EPA's existing reg-
ulatory and non-regulatory programs."9
Implementing the strategy, therefore, will
require the EPA to rethink the way it currently
allocates its responsibilities and resources.' 0
As to the second objective, the goal of
environmental justice is now a priority on the
nation's environmental agenda." Specifically,
the nation's history demonstrates how minor-
ity and low-income populations have dispro-
portionately shouldered the impacts of envi-
ronmental hazards. 12 Thus far, public partici-
pation in shaping environmental policy has
generally taken the form of consumer power,
in other words, choosing not to purchase envi-
ronmentally harmful products. Environmental
justice, however, demands more than an indi-
rect influence on industry's production
process decisions. Environmental justice
requires greater and more direct community
input by making citizens stakeholders in the
decisionmaking process. 3
To successfully reinvent regulation, new
policies must allow industry sufficient flexibil-
ity to make the necessary modifications to
7 See Pollution Prevention Strategy, 56 Fed. Reg.
7849 (1991).
8. id.
9. Id. at 7849 (emphasis added).
i0. See id.
II. See Executive Order 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629
(1994) (directing each federal agency to "make achieving
environmental lustice part of its mission"); see also Think
Tank Urges Greater Emphasis on Environment in Policy Decisions,
Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) I, i (July 27, 1993) Ihereinafter
Think Tank].
12. See Steven A. Herman, EPA's FY 1996 Enforcement
and Compliance Assurance Priorities, II No. 12 NAAG NAT'L
ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J. 3. 3 (1996) Ihereinafter EPAs FY
19961.
13. See Think Tank, supra note II, at 1. Potential
stakeholders include (1) community-based groups, (2)
business and industry, (3) academic institutions, (4) state,
tribal and local governments, (5) non-governmental orga-
nizations and (6) environmental groups. See id. Greater
participation by these stakeholders will, in turn, lead to
increased demands for public access to information. See
stay competitive in the market. Tie increased
flexibility, however, does not mean that the
EPA should relax its enforcement efforts.
Rather, it means that private citizens must
step up and also participate to supplement
the EPA's regulatory efforts. In sum, reinvent-
ing regulation, without compromising the
goals of pollution prevention and environ-
mental justice, will require the lEgal commu-
nity to explore different alternatives that can
establish a lasting and workable relationship
between regulators, industry and private citi-
zens.
A. Search For Altematives
I Audit Privilege and lminnity Laws
in searching for alternatives, some law-
makers suggested enacting environmental
audit privilege and immunity laws.' 4 Twenty-
three states already have such laws in place,
either by policy or by legislation.15 Two bills
that went before Congress, Senate Bill 582
and House Resolution 1884, seemed to follow
that trend.' 6 These bills sought (1) to establish
a federal audit privilege and immunity law for
information discovered through compliance
audits, and (2) to immunize violators from
civil enforcement and criminal prosecution if
violations are voluntarily corrected and dis-
Executive Order 12,898. 50 Fed, Reg, at 7629-30 (directing
agencies to make readily accessible to the public infor-
mation about environmental risks), See the discussion In
Part I.A. of how different alternatives limit the public's
access to information or ability to participate in industry's
environmental decisions. The discussion eventually
describes how Good Neighbor Agreements (GNAs) can
ensure that affected stakeholders are not left out of those
decisions.
14. See Jim Moore, The Case for an Environmental Audit
Privilege, I WASH. ENVTL. COMPLIANCE UPvATE 1, 7 (Dec.
1994).
15. As of the writing of this Note, states with some
form of an audit privilege and immunityI law include
Michigan, New Hampshire, Ohio, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Alaska, Montana, Arkansas, Colorado. Nevada,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wyoming, and
Rhode Island. See Good Neighbor Prolect, State bu State
Audit Legislation Scorecard (last modified jan 22, 1998)
<http.JAwww.envirolink.orgforgs/gnp>
16. S. 582, 104th Cong. (1995), H R. 1884, 105th
Cong. (1997).
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closed to regulators.' 7 The purpose of an audit
privilege and immunity law rests on the belief
that by treating environmental audits as privi-
leged information, industry will be more apt to
voluntarily conduct comprehensive environ-
mental self-audits.' 8 Self-audits, in turn, bene-
fit the environment and public health because
they lead to increased discovery and correction
of violations.19
The implementation of audit privilege and
immunity laws, however, faces immense oppo-
sition and has emerged as a source of great
debate.20 For one, the Clinton Administration
and the EPA vigorously oppose such laws.2i In
fact, the EPA "opposes all state audit privi-
lege/immunity laws in any form."22 Regulators
feel that limiting access to valuable informa-
tion regarding industry's noncompliance hin-
ders effective enforcement of environmental
laws.23 Consequently, regulators see audit priv-
ilege and immunity laws as detrimental to the
environment and public health.24 Furthermore,
regulators believe audit privilege and immuni-
ty laws act as disincentives for industry to even
invest in pollution control if instances of non-
compliance can be kept confidential.
2 '
Community and environmental groups
pose additional opposition to audit privilege
and immunity laws.2 6 These groups view such
legislation as a setback in their effort to
increase the citizen's right of access to industry
information.27 The legislation, in effect, blocks
access to industry's records of compliance with
17. See id.. see also Environmental Auditing: Clinton
Administration Hardens Opposition to Legislation Granting
Privilege, Immunity. 20 Chem. Reg. Rep, (BNA) 411, 411
(June 28, 1996) Ihereinafter Environmental Auditing: Clinton
Administration 1.
18. See Moore. supra note 14. at 7-9.
19. See id. at 9.
20. See Michael Ray Hams, Promoting Corporate Self-
Compliance: An Examination of the Debate Over Legal Protection
for Environmental Audits, 23 ECOLOGY LO. 663, 683 (1996).
21. See Environmental Auditing: Clinton Administration,
supra note 17, at 411; Environmental Protection Agency.
EPA Memo on Addressing State Audit, Immunity Laws and
Legislation Dated Nov. 10. 1997 21 Chem. Reg, Rep, (BNA)
1006, 1006 (Nov. 10, 1997) Ihereinafter EPA Memol.
22. EPA Memo, supra note 21. at 1006.
23. See id. ("Audit privileges make it more difficult to
environmental laws,28 The groups feel that -no
current legislative initiative goes more to
the heart of the public lack of confidence in the
business community's commitment to Ithel
protection of the public health and the envi-
ronment than the environmental audit privi-
lege debate."29 With mounting opposition to
proposed legislation that limits access to
industry information, the use of audit pnvilege
and immunity laws as an alternative seems
unlikely. in response, other innovative options
must be explored
2. Tie EPAs Audit Policy
The EPA issued its Final Policy Statement
on Incentives for Self-Policing Discovery,
Correction, and Prevention of Violations (1995
Self-Policing Policy)30 as a "positive alternative
to statutory audit privileges that promote
secrecy.'31 To qualify under the 1995 Self-
Policing Policy, the regulated entity must meet
nine conditions: (1) systematic discovery (vio-
lations must be discovered through an envt-
ronmental audit or an objective, documented,
systematic procedure or practice reflecting due
diligence in preventing, detecting and correct-
ing violations); '(2) voluntary discovery (viola-
tions must be discovered voluntarily and not
under legal mandate), (3) prompt disclosure;
(4) independent discovery and disclosure; (5)
correction and remediation; (6) recurrence pre-
vention; (7) no repeat violations, (8) exclusion
of certain violations (those which result in sen-
enforce the nations environmental laws by making it eas-
ier to shield evidence of wrongdoing 'j
24 See id
25 See id
26 See Hams, supra note 20, at 667
27 See id
28- See zd
29 Lindsay Newland Bowker Environmental Audit
Pnvilege and the Public interest, II P=r2"r ,. Lom Lrr" 1, 2
(April 1997)
30 Incentives for Self-Policing Discovery,
Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations, 60
Fed Reg 66,706 (19951 Ihereinafter 1995 Self-Policing
Policyl
31 Steven Herman, Statement of EPAs Final Self-
Disclosure Policy, NAAG E',Vr UPDAmE IDec 1995)
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ous harm or imminent and substantial endan-
germent); and (9) cooperation with the EPA.32
As incentives for industry to undertake
self-policing, the EPA will refrain from seeking
gravity-based penalties, to forgo recommend-
ing certain violations for criminal prosecution,
and to relinquish the use of environmental
audit reports to initiate civil or criminal
enforcement actions.3 3 Thus, in 1996, in most
of the forty cases settled under the 1995 Self-
Policing Policy, the EPA chose to waive the
gravity-based penalties. 34 In deciding whether
to waive the penalties, the EPA relies on cer-
tain certifications made by the regulated enti-
ty.35 The regulated entity itself certifies that vio-
lations have been corrected, efforts have been
undertaken to remedy resulting harms, and
steps have been taken to prevent recurrence.3 6
The EPA's limited resources, however, could
potentially stifle its ability to verify these certi-
fications.37 The EPA's 1995 Self-Policing Policy
largely overlooks the potential external
accountability mechanism offered by increased
citizen participation and downplays the possi-
bility of increasing the public's role in the reg-
ulatory process.
Where should we go from here? How do we
encourage self-policing by industry without
compromising environmental standards, that
is, without compromising the health of the
public and the environment?
3. The Good Neighbor Agreement
Alternative
This Note explores "Good Neighbor Agree-
ments" (GNAs) as a viable and promising alter-
native. A GNA is a legally binding agreement
32. 1995 Self-Policing Policy, 60 Fed. Reg. at 66,711-12.
33. See id. at 66,711 ("Gravity-based penalties" repre-
sent 'that portion over and above the economic benefit, i.e.,
the punitive portion of the penalty, rather than that portion
representing a defendant's economic gain from noncompli-
ance."). This type of penalty primarily reflects the senous-
ness of the defendant's conduct. See id. at 66,707
34. See Enforcement: Punitive Penalties Waived in Most
Settlements with Companies Using Audit Policy, 27 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 1931, 1931 (Jan. 24, 1997).
35. See 1995 Self-Policing Policy, 60 Fed. Reg. at
66,711.
36. See ld.
negotiated by stakeholders and industry In
which the violating industry agrees to reduce
or eliminate pollution risks to the surrounding
community. GNAs achieve environmental
excellence by empowering local stakeholders
to effectively bargain with local industries and
to jointly engage in creative decisionmaking.
This open dialogue ultimately culminates in
environmentally superior results in terms of
pollution prevention and environmental jus-
tice while simultaneously meeting the needs of
local industries. Part 11 outlines the elements
of a GNA. Part Ill examines how GNAs fit in an
environmental management systEm and audit-
ing program. Suggesting the use of the EPA's
existing enforcement tools to implement
GNAs, Part IV describes how a GNA can be
made legally enforceable and what incentives
industry has to enter into a G(NA. Part V
explains how GNAs advance the goals of pollu-
tion prevention and environmental justice.
Part VI explores the obstacles and the incen-
tives to the implementation and the enforce-
ment of GNAs on a federal regulatory level.
II. Good Neighbor Agreements (GNAs)
A. Underlying Pnnciples of GNAs
Stakeholder involvement forms the heart
of GNAs. The active role of stakeholders
through GNAs compensates for the lack of
resources the EPA has to effectively "watchdog"
all the activities of local industries) 8 Essential-
ly, GNAs afford those citizens most affected by
the activities of local industries ar opportunity
to become involved as stakeholders and work
for improvements in their community. 9
37. See id. at 66,707.
38. See Sanford Lewis, Moving Forward Toward
Environmental Excellence: Corporate Environmental Audits
and the Public's Right to Know 6 (Feb 1. 1905) (unpublished
manuscnpt, Goad Neighbor Prolect for Sustainable Industries)
(on file with author) Ihereinafter Moving Forward Toward
Environmental Excellencel.
39. See id. at 15 Local stakeholders generally consist of
private citizens, community organizations, environmental
organizations and labor unions See Good Neighbor Project for
Sustainable industnes, Model Pnnapes forStakelwolder Evaluation1 or
"Audit" of Health, Environment and Safety at an Industnal Facilitu I (last
modified Mar. 4, 1998) <httplAwwenvirolinkorg/orgs/gnp>
Ihereinafter Model Pnnciples l,
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Sgang 1999 Gocd Nu~ar A~eements
Specifically, GNAs accomplish citizen involve-
ment through stakeholder audits.40 Stakehold-
er audits are opportunities for local stakehold-
ers to inspect and audit facilities themselves or
act as an oversight group to an audit.4' The
gained information, in turn, empowers stake-
holders to commit local industries to open
negotiations. 42 Ultimately, the open discus-
sions characteristic of GNAs yield two critical
components in the reinvention of regulation.
First, GNAs generate environmentally superior
commitments by local industries in the form of
pollution prevention strategies. 43 Second,
GNAs incorporate expanded industry disclo-
sure requirements and increased access to
information, resulting in citizen empowerment
and informed citizen oversight of the commit-
ments made by local industries-goals of the
environmental lustice movement.44
The following outlines the major principles
of a GNA as defined by Sanford Lewis, the for-
mer Director of the Good Neighbor Prolect for
Sustainable Industries and a major proponent
of GNAs. 45 These principles work to establish
the balanced relationship between local indus-
try and its stakeholders that is fundamental to
innovative problem solving.4 6
An expansive right of access to information,
Stakeholders have a right of access to review
company documentation and studies concern-
ing industrial activities with potential effects
on the environment and public health.47 Also,
stakeholders have a right of access to audit the
40. See Moving Forward Toward Environmental
Excellence. supra note 38, at 12.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. Sanford Lewis. Moving Forward Through Evolution.
Not Backward Through Devolution 6 (last modified Feb 22,
1998) <http-J/www.envirolink.orglorgs/gnp> [hereinafter
Moving Forward Through Evolutionl.
44. See id.
45. Sanford Lewis. Feel Good Notions, Corporate Power.
and the "Reinvention" of Environmental Law 26 (last modified
Mar. 17, 1997) <http://www.envirolink.orglorgsfgnp>
Ihereinafter Feel Good Notionsl. Sanford Lewis has now
taken a position as Strategic Counsel on Corporate
Accountability on behalf of community and environmen-
tal organizations, trade unions, tnal lawyers and public
policy organizations. Lewis still works for the Good
local facility's compliance with environmental
laws and regulations 48 This right of access lev-
els the bargaining positions of the industry and
its stakeholders 4 As a result, the opened
channels of communication lead to collabora-
tion and produce creative solutions 5C
Stakeholder initiative, Local industry does
not impose the GNA on its stakeholders. rather
the stakeholders actively seek to bring the GNA
about with the local industry 5
Shanng control in the participation process:
Interested stakeholders possess the right to
participate equally in the negotiation process,
reducing the possibility of a negotiation panel
dominated by participants specifically selected
by the local industry.5 2 Furthermore, compre-
hensive coverage of issues and concerns fol-
lows the shared control of all participants in
setting the agenda of discussion 53
Parity in decisionmaking The GNA is not
signed until each participating stakeholder
agrees to the oblectives and terms of the
agreement 14 Nothing short of actual consen-
sus with representatives of the local industry
will give effect to the GNA_
5 5
Independent experts. Stakeholders pos-
sess the right to have their own independent
experts participate on the negotiation panel 56
By equalizing the technical expertise of both
sides, independent experts bolster the bar-
gaining positions of stakeholders on technical
matters that are often beyond the average per-
son's understanding.5 7
Neighbor Project on a limited pro bona and special pro-
lects basis
46 Seeid at 20
47 See id
48 See id
49 See d at 19
50 See id at 19-20
51 Seed at20





57 See Feel GoM Notions, supra note 45, at 21
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Shared benefits. A negotiation mode of
cooperation and collaboration produces
shared benefits in which all participants' inter-
ests and needs are somehow met through cre-
ative and innovative solutions.
58
Holistic content: The GNA attempts a
comprehensive multimedia approach to envi-
ronmental problems.
59
Best practices: Together, the local indus-
try and its stakeholder strive for economically
and environmentally superior solutions.60
Enforceable agreements. The GNA is legal-
ly enforceable, 61 and its violation allows for
legal redress.
B. Examples of GNAs
To date, several GNAs have been entered
into between local community groups and
industry In Point Comfort, Texas, a local com-
munity group, Calhoun County Resource
Watch (CCRW), entered into a GNA with Alcoa
Aluminum (Alcoa).62 The GNA was intended to
address the community's concerns over Alcoa's
discharge of production process pollutants
into Lavaca Bay. The terms of the agreement
included an agreement from Alcoa to study
"zero discharge" wastewater treatment technol-
ogy in exchange for which CCRW agreed to
delay challenges to federal and state permits
pending the outcome of the study.63 A mutual-
ly agreed upon expert conducted the study,64
and the committee overseeing the study




60. See id. at 21-22.
61. See id. at 22. This Note illustrates how GNAs can
be made legally enforceable through incorporation into
the EPA's existing enforcement tools, namely, supplemen-
tal environmental projects. See infra discussion Part IV.
62. See Good Neighbor Project for Sustainable
Industries, Alcoa Aluminum Zero Discharge Agreement I (last
visited Mar, 16, 1998) <http://www.envirolink.org/
orgs/gnp> Ihereinafter Alcoa Agreementl.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65 See Good Neighbor Project for Sustainable
Industries, The Rhone-Poulenc Community Audit Agreement I
In Manchester, Texas, Texans United and
other community groups negotiated a GNA
with Rhone-Poulenc (the Rhone-Poulenc
Agreement) in response to a petrochemical
plant accident on Rhone-Poulenc's facility.6'
Rhone-Poulenc agreed (1) to pay for an audit of
its facility by a stakeholder-approved auditor,
and (2) to allow members of the community
groups to participate in the audit. 66 The Rhone-
Poulenc Agreement also provided that Rhone-
Poulenc engage in public disclosure of compa-
ny documents pertaining to the facility's effects
on the environment and public health.67 The
agreement ultimately produced a working rela-
tionship between Rhone-Poulenc and local
stakeholders. 68
In Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, the Com-
munity/Labor Refinery Tracking Committee
(C/LRTC) brought a suit against Sun Oil for
Clean Air Act violations.69 As part Df the settle-
ment agreement, Sun Oil and C/LFTC negotiat-
ed a GNA (the Sun Oil Agreement).70 The Sun
Oil Agreement required Sun Oil to invest five
million dollars in improving its refinery to fur-
ther reduce air emissions.l Sun Oil also
agreed to implement community environmen-
tal projects such as tree plantings, a bike trail
and environmental education programs 7 2
In Richmond, California, Chevron Refinery
(Chevron) entered into a GNA with the West
County Toxics Coalition, Citizens for a Better
Environment and People Do! (the Chevron
Refinery Agreement) in response to Clean Air
Act violations.7 3 Chevron agreed tc install leak-





69 See Good Neighbor Project for Sustainable
Industries, Sun Oil Reaches Good Neighbor Agreement with
Neighbor/Workers 12/30/97 I (last visited Mar 16, 1998)





73. See Good Neighbor Project for Sustainable
industries, Chevron Refineru Pollution Prevention Aareement I
Manonne F. Addalico Volume 5, Numbr 3
Spung 1999
less valves, not to claim pollution credits for
valve emissions reductions, to implement air
pollution monitoring prescribed by communi-
ty-suggested target chemicals, and to continue
reductions in toxic emissions.74 Chevron also
agreed to contribute five million dollars over
the course of five years to local communities.7
In Rodeo, California, the Shoreline Envi-
ronmental Alliance, Crockett/Rodeo Coalition
and Citizens for a Better Environment negoti-
ated a GNA with Unocal Corporation
(Unocal).76 A provision of the GNA required an
independent safety audit to be paid for by
Unocal.77 Oversight of the audit was to be con-
ducted by a community-based committee. 8
Among other promises to improve and protect
the environment and public health, Unocal
agreed to broaden its public disclosures, land-
scape and vegetate areas on its property, and
pay for a medical clinic for the diagnosis and
treatment of patients with release-related ill-
nesses. 79
III. Recognizing the Importance of
Environmental Management Systems
and Environmental Audits
GNAs recognize the vital roles environ-
mental management systems (EMSs) and
audits perform in the reinvention of regulation.
EMSs allow for industries to become more
(last visited Mar. 16, 1998) <httpw/www.environlink org/
orgs/gnp> [hereinafter Chevron Refinery Agreement].
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See Good Neighbor Proiect for Sustainable






80. See Cascio. supra note 3. at 288.
81. See Craig D. Galli. ISO 14000 and Envronmental
Management Systems in a Nutshell, 9 UTAH B,. 15. 15
(1996).
82. See Robert Anthony Reiley. The New Paradigm
ISO 14000 and its Place in Regulatory Reform. 22 1. CORP L
535, 546 (1997).
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proactive in protecting the environment while
simultaneously becoming more efficient and
competitive in the market 8 Generally, an EMS
is a set of procedures implemented by an
industry to assess its environmental perfor-
mance and its compliance with environmental
laws 81 Furthermore. an EMS often includes an
audit component,82 An audit is a systematic
and documented review by an industry of its
operations and practices geared toward com-
plying with environmental laws 83 An audit may
be used to review a facility's legal compliance,
to assess the effectiveness of the EMS, and to
evaluate any risks posed by production
processes and practices 84 Essentially, an audit
works as a "snapshot" of a facilitys environ-
mental performance and compliance 85 To-
gether. the EMS and audit work to identify, cor-
rect and avoid environmental problems, bene-
fiting both the industries engaged in the EMSs
and the citizens affected by the activities of the
industries -
A company utilizes an EMS to 11) Identify
problematic impacts on the environment from
its products, services and process, 121 mini-
mize those problems, and 13) train its employ-
ees to avoid those problems by engaging in
environmental quality control 87 A company
approaches environmental management and
compliance as an aspect of asset manage-
ment .8s As such, the EMS becomes integrated
83 See EN' %EA P !E,-T r. ,E-,
Enironmental Pttecton Agency Restatement on Poicies Retaring
to Environmenlal Auditing, Cl H0 A LI-ABA C,'.,'. ,z
LEGAL Ecu: 331, 334 i1995)
84 See id -At a minimum, audit objectives should
include assessing compliance with applicable enr.'ron-
mental laws and evaluating the adequacy of internal com-
pliance policies, procedures, and personnel training pro-
grams to ensure comriplnce Id at 335
85 See Reiley, supra note 82, at 546
86 See E% .',:-.T L PFI-azr %A:--;7, supra note
83, at 334
87 See Stephen L Kass, The Lawyers Ro!e in
Imp!emenling 50 14000 II N Rrs:j-:Es &E- T 3 31 I997j-
88 See Asset Management Not Regulations, Seen Shaping
Corp.rate Enironment Policy Nat[ En't Daily IBNAi d6
(May?29, IQ97t [hereinafterAssetManagementI EMSs"allow
companies to manage en'.'ironmental quality and compli-
ance in the same way they manage other corporate pro-
Volume 5, NumW 3
into the regular business operations of the com-
pany.89
In other words, an EMS functions as a
proactive risk management tool to cut costs and
enhance a company's internal efficiency and
competitiveness.90 Environmental management
makes such good business sense that many
companies already have EMSs and'audit proce-
dures in place.91 Without environmental man-
agement, a company exposes itself to the possi-
bility of stiff civil and criminal enforcement
penalties for noncompliance, public pressure
and substantial cleanup costs.
9 2
EMSs and auditing offer several legal and
economic benefits to industries.93 First, environ-
mental management may bring to light oppor-
tunities for a company to become more efficient
and reduce costs by avoiding waste and improv-
ing the use of materials and resources in pro-
duction pr'ocesses.94 Second, EMSs and audits
offer ways to avoid or reduce enforcement
penalties for noncompliance. 95 By reviewing its
production processes and practices, a company
potentially gains information necessary to avoid
future noncompliance. 96 Third, implementation
of an EMS and environmental audits may offer
regulatory benefits.97 If undertaken voluntarily,
regulatory agencies view EMSs and voluntary
audits as mitigating factors in civil and criminal
enforcement actions.98 Fourth, environmental
management allows a company to tap into the
"green" market, appealing to consumers as envi-
grams and assets." Steven A. Herman, From the Assistant
Administrator: Environmental Performance Data Help EPA
Measure the Impact of Its Environmental Enforcement and
Compliance Assurance Program, 12 No. 3 NAAG NAT'L ENV"L.
ENFORCEMENT J. 13, 16 (1997).
89. See Asset Management, supra note 88. at d6.
90. See id.
91 See Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery,
Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations, 60
Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66,706 (1995) Ihereinafter 1995 Self-
Policing Policyl.
92. See Christopher L. Bell, The ISO 14001
Environmental Management Systems Standard: A Modest
Perspective, 27 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10622, 10622
(Dec. 1997).
93. See Harris, supra note 20, at 679.
94. See Cascio, supra note 3, at 288.
95. See Harris. supra note 20, at 679.
ronmentally responsible producers 9 9 Fifth,
improved public relations arise when a compa-
ny manifests concern for its impacts on the
environmentOO Sixth, a company engaged in
environmental management appears as a sound
investment to current and potential inves-
torsOi The rationale is that a company imple-
menting an EMS and performing audits is less
likely to be in noncompliance and less likely to
incur liability 02 Finally, a company may engage
in environmental management merely to ease
the pressures resulting from the public scrutiny
of its processes and practices engendered by
right-to-know laws 0 3 Ultimately, a company
finds that its investments in environmental
management are recouped and lead to more
profit in the longrun
04
From the standpoint of affected citizens, the
most important facet of EMSs and auditing
stems from the likelihood that environmental
issues will be diffused throughout the corporate
structure.10' A company no longer considers
environmental concerns as side issues in the
planning process 06 The infiltration of environ-
mental concerns into all aspects ol the produc-
tion process and corporate practices breeds an
environmental ethic in the company s employ-
ees to become more environmentally responsi-
ble.IOT In turn, this environmental ethic may
materialize into concrete improvements in the
company's environmental perFormance,108
Additionally, the search for ways to become
96. See id. at 679-80.
97 See Cascio, supra note 3, at 289
98. See discussion supra Part I A 2,





104. See Henry R Balikov & Patrick 0 Cavanaugh,
What We Need to Know About ISO 14000, 10 NAT. REsoURCES &
ENV'T 64, 65-66 (1996).
105. See Cascio, supra note 3, at 288.
106. See Asset Management, supra note 88, at d6
107 See Cascio, supra note 3, at 288,
108. See Cascio, supra note 3, at 288,
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more efficient and reduce costs may actually
induce a company to opt for pollution preven-
tion strategies instead of end-of-process con-
trol and treatment. 0 9 Once industry discovers
that pollution prevention. can actually improve
its competitiveness in the market, 110 surround-
ing communities will benefit from the resultant
improvements in environmental protection.
Reinventing regulation redefines the tradi-
tional roles of industries, regulators and pri-
vate citizens. Environmental management is
evidence of this transformation. EMSs and
auditing programs demonstrate a proactive
approach and corporate initiative to improve
environmental performance.iii Corporate ini-
tiative stands in stark contrast to the conven-
tional attitude of industries to address envi-
ronmental problems only after receiving a gov-
ernment directive. 112
Another transformation prompted by rein-
vention is the development of partnerships
between industries and regulators. With limit-
ed government resources to ensure maximum
compliance, the EPA relies on industries to
assume some responsibility in environmental
improvement through self-policing.ii3 Indus-
tries self-police their compliance and environ-
mental performance through EMSs and audit-
ing programs. In return, self-policing allows for
increased flexibility vis-&-vis the command-
and-control scheme." 4
An additional transformation appears to
be in the form of increased citizen participa-
tion. A company sometimes undertakes an
109. See id.
110. See Asset Management. supra note 88. at d6.
111. See Cascio, supra note 3. at 288.
112. See id.
113. See Incentives for Self-Policing Discovery,
Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of violations, 60
Fed. Reg. 66.706, 66,707 (1995) Ihereinafter 1995 Self-
Policing Policyl.
114. See Paula C. Murray, The Intenaional
Management Standard, ISO 14000: A Non-Tariff Barner or a
Step to an Emerging Global Environmental Policy?. 18 U PA I
INrL' ECON. L. 577 584 (1997).
115. See Reiley. supra note 82, at 546.
116. See Feel Good Notions, supra note 45. at 21
!17. See Good Neighbor Prolect for Sustainable
Industries, Public Policy Analysis on Corporate Self-Policing and
EMS in response to public pressure and scruti-
ny.1i5 An EMS, therefore, presents an opportu-
nity for actual citizen input into the redesign-
ing of production processes, GNAs potentially
provide the procedure by which citizen input
can be incorporated into a company s EMS and
decisionmaking process Hr6 The stakeholders
ensure the external accountability of a local
industry's EMS and environmental auditing
practices.ii7 In addition. GNAs allow citizen
participation to augment the 'watchdog" func-
tions of regulatory agencies I's The symbiotic
relationship that develops between industries,
regulators and private citizens is characteristic
of GNAs To facilitate the implementation of
GNAs, however, proponents of GNAs should
consider the use of the EPAs existing enforce-
ment tools
IV. UtIlizIng ExIsting Enforcement Tools
A. Supplemental Environmental Projects
Supplemental Environmental Projects
(SEPs) are becoming integral in the EPA's
enforcement settlements 119 The EPA already
incorporates SEPs in at least five to ten percent
of all its enforcement settlements 1M Due to
the increased use of SEPs, the EPA saw the
need to expound on its SEP policy'2f Con-
sequently, the EPA issued the Interim Revised
EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects
Policy (1995 SEP Policy) to expand and clarify
its previous SEP policy 122 More importantly for
purposes of the GNA alternative, the 1995 SEP
Related Regulatory Reinventon InItaWtiL I ilast m:irhed Mar
4, 1998) <http /si . w envroltnk orgforgs'gnp> [here-
inafter Public Piqcy Anifyyal
118 See M1''ng Forxard Toward Eniranmental
Excellence fuprra nzte 38, at 6
I I9 Part IVA I prc7ades the defniton ot
Supplemental En'ronmental Project ISEPsi
120 See Growth Expected in Program to Cut Finei in
ExchangeJor Pollutiln Prevnlin 23 En,"t Rep (BNAi 2 692,
2.692 IFeb 12, 1993j [hereinafter Growlth Expected in
Prcyraml
121 See Mark I Zimmermann, working with EPA.
Rewued Policy on Supplemental Environmental Projects, II Na I
E ;'rtL CC"r',LfAE & Ir..: SrRE 1, 1 t 1995)
122 interim Revised EPA Supplemental Environ-
mental Projects Policy 60 Fed Reg 24,856, 24,856 (19951
Iheremafter 1995 SEP Policy[ Since the , nting of this
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Policy provides the EPA with greater discretion
and flexibility in entering into enforcement
agreements. 123
in addition to the EPA, industry, communi-
ty groups and environmental organizations
also strongly support the inclusion of SEPs in
enforcement settlements. 124 Essentially, SEPs
function as alternatives to enforcement penal-
ties in lieu of which the violating company
agrees to undertake environmentally beneficial
expenditures. 125 Furthermore, SEPs provide
greater flexibility, when compared to the EPAs
traditional enforcement approach, in designing
strategies to improve environmental perfor-
mance. 126 For this reason and because of the
EPA's increased discretion in entering into SEP
agreements, the innovation underlying the
ONA alternative fits comfortably within the
flexible, creative and corporate voluntarism
approach of the SEP scheme.
In following the five-step process estab-
lished by the EPA, a proposed project qualifies
as a SEP if it. (1) meets the definition of a SEP;
(2) satisfies all legal guidelines; (3) falls within
one of the seven categories of SEPs; (4) impos-
es an appropriate enforcement penalty; and (5)
is clearly defined in the settlement agree-
ment.127
1. Definition of SEPs
The EPA defines SEPs as "environmentally
beneficial projects which a defendant/respon-
Note, the EPA issued its Final EPA Supplemental
Environmental Prolects Policy (Final Policy), 63 Fed. Reg.
24,796 (1998), on May 5, 1998. This Final Policy mirrors
the 1995 SEP Policy, except that it greatly expands the use
of SEPs in settlements and clarifies issues raised while
the 1995 SEP Policy had been in effect. See Cheryl Hogue,
Targeted Violations, Audit Policy Review Among EPAs 1998
Activities, Officials Say, 1998 Daily Envt. Rep. (BNA) 9. at d18.
123. 1995 SEP Policy, 60 Fed. Reg. at 24,856.
124. See Leslie Kaschak, Supplemental Environmental
Projects: Evolution of Policy, 2 ENVrL. L. 465. 466 (1996).
125. See Growth Expected in Program, supra note 120. at
2.692; Kaschak, supra note 124, at 467
126. See Growth Expected in Program, supra note 120, at
2,693.
127 See 1995 SEP Policy, 60 Fed. Reg. at 24,857
128. Id. at 24,856.
129. See id. at 24,857 Though improvement and
dent agrees to undertake in settlement of an
enforcement action, but which the defendant/
respondent is not otherwise legally required to
perform." 128 "Environmentally beneficial projects"
advance environmental and public health
improvements and protections 129 "In settlement
of an enforcement action" indicates that "(1) Ithel
EPA has the opportunity to help shape the scope
of the prolect before it is implemented; and (2)
the project is not commenced until after the
Agency has identified a violation." 30 "Not other-
wise legally required to perform" means the pro-
ject must be voluntarily undertaken and not
required by law.131
GNAs amount to environmentally beneficial
projects because they aim to generate environ-
mental commitments from industry to eliminate
or reduce pollution risks to the surrounding com-
munity. 32 One example of a GNAs potential to
be environmentally beneficial is the Chevron
Refinery Agreement 33 Chevron agreed to reduce
its toxic pollution by making improvements to its
facility and installing such devices as leakless
valves. 34 Therefore, GNAs demonstrate immense
potential as environmentally beneficial SEPs
As an after-the-fact undertaking. GNAs satis-
fy the second condition of being a part of an
enforcement settlement. 3 5 Experience has
shown that a local industry and its stakeholders
embark upon a GNA after the occurrence of envi-
ronmental violations. 36 For example, the
Rhone-Poulenc Agreement was a esponse to a
protection of environmental and public health are the
primary goals, incidental benefits to the defendant or
respondent do not invalidate the SEP See id
130. Id. Disqualification of a SEP occurs when the
defendant or respondent undertakes the prolect before a
violation has been identified. See id at n I
131. Seeid. at 24,857
132. See Moving Forward Throuah Evo'ution, supra note
43, at 6.
133. See Chevron Refineri Aareement, supra note 73, at I
134. See id. at 1-2.
135 See Sanford Lewis & Diane Henkels, Good
Neighbor Agreements. A Tool for Environmenta' and Social Justice
I (last visited Mar. 25, 1998) <http//ww.cpn org/sec-





petrochemical plant accident resulting in the
release of poisonous sulfur dioxide. 37 The Sun Oil
Agreement serves as another example. 138 The
GNA was in response to emissions from the Sun
Oil's refinery affecting the health of surrounding
communities. 39 Though a GNA is primarily
entered into by a local industry and its stakehold-
ers, nothing appears to bar the EPA from partici-
pating in the input process. 40
Finally, while legally enforceable once made.
no legal requirement exists that industnes enter
into GNAs with local stakeholders in the first
place. Stakeholder initiative, not legal mandate,
prompts the formation of GNAs.141 Taking the
form of a SEP simply adds to the enforceability of
a GNA. If a GNA is a condition of a settlement
agreement with the EPA, a violation of the GNA
will give rise to a legal cause of action. As illus-
trated, GNAs comport with the EPAs definition of
a SEP
2. Legal Guidelines
A proposed prolect must follow certain legal
guidelines to ensure that the EPA has the consti-
tutional and statutory authority to enter into the
settlement agreement. 42
Nexus requirement: There must be an ade-
quate nexus between the proposed project and
the violation. 43 A nexus is generally established if
the proposed project addresses impacts at the
site where the violation occurred or at least with-
in the immediate ecosystem or geographic area, 144
137 See Sanford Lewis. Precedents for Corporate-
Community Compacts and Good Neighbor Agreements 2 (last
modified Mar. 4. 1998) <httpi./www.envirolinkorg/
orgslgnp> Ihereinafter Precedents for Corporate-Community
Compactsl.
138. See Sun Oil Agreement, supra note 69. at I,
139. See id.
140. There are no provisions in the model GNA
which explicitly bar participation by the EPA in shaping
the agreement. See Model Pnnciples. supra note 39, at 1-3
The EPA exercises the bulk of its discretion in the
approval of GNAs as SEPs. See Interim Revised EPA
Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy. 60 Fed Reg
24.856, 24.857 (1995) Ihereinafter 1995 SEP PolIcyl,
141. See Feel Good Notions, supra note 45, at 20,
142. See 1995 SEP Policy, 60 Fed. Reg. at 24,858.
143. See id.
144. See id.
The stakeholders in GNAs establish the nec-
essary nexus. GNA stakeholders are usually
those citizens most directly impacted by the
activities of the local industry
145
Statutory objective- The proposed project
must advance the purposes of the statute that is
the subject of the enforcement action.146
The right-to-know statutes, Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act (TSCA) and Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
(EPCRA). are the underlying bases for a majority
of approved SEPs.147 The broadened disclosure
requirements of GNAs accomplish the objec-
tives of TSCA, EPCRA. and another similar right-
to-know statute, the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act IFIFRA).148 In
addition to advancing public disclosure objec-
tives. GNAs further the general objective of most
environmental statutes to improve the quality
of the environment Stakeholders work with the
local industry to design creative and environ-
mentally superior solutions to address environ-
mental problems 140
Independent of the EPA The EPA control or
management of SEP funds or implementation of
the SEP disqualifies a proposed project as a
SEP 10
A model GNA establishes a trust fund to be
managed by a designated trustee who is pre-
sumably independent of the EPA 151 In the
Unocal Agreement with CBE, for example,
Unocal promised to pay a total of $4 5 million
145 See Moving Forward Tow'ard Environmental
Excellence. fupra note 38, at 15
146 See 1095 SEP Policy 60 Fed Reg at 24858 The
statutory objective requirement aims at preventing the
unauthorized expansion of EPAs discretion and enforce-
ment budget See Kaschak supra note 124, at 476
147 See Zimmermann supra note 121, at 4
148 See Movina Forward Through Evolution, supra note
43, at 6
14q See I
150 See 1-995 SEP Pohici, 60 Fed Reg at 24,858 The
EPA may prc;.ide oversight over the SEP but cannot itself
administer the SEP See id
151 See Model Pnncaples, supra note 39 at 2 The pre-
sumption that GNA funds are independent of EPA control
and management of funds relies on the fact that GNAs are
primarily entered into between a local industry and its
stakeholders See Feel Good Notions, supra note 45, at 20
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to local community programs. 152 The commu-
nity groups themselves, not the EPA, act as
trustees of the funds and decide how to allo-
cate the funds to meet the needs of the com-
munity at large. 153 The primary actors in a GNA,
therefore, are the local industry and its stake-
holders.154
Written settlement agreement: A written set-
tlement agreement must specifically detail the
proposed project.
55
The Good Neighbor Project for Sustainable
Industries produces a guide outlining the
model principles for a GNA. 156 The model prin-
ciples provide reasonable assurances that the
settlement agreement will specifically detail
the nature, terms and scope of the GNA." 57 The
detail required for a GNA, therefore, ensures
that this requirement will be met.
Rule against augmentation of appropnations.
The project may not involve obligations the
EPA is legally required to undertake itself or for
which appropriations have already been pro-
vided to the EPA. 158 In other words, local indus-
try's efforts pursuant to a GNA cannot be
duplicative of what the EPA is already statuto-
rily required to do.
The EPA's enforcement budget remains
uncertain. 159 The scope of GNAs extends to the
regulatory functions the EPA lacks the fiscal
and human resources, i.e., appropriations, to
152. See Precedents for Corporate-Community Compacts,
supra note 137 at 8.
153. See id.
154. The terms of a model GNA mention only the
following as participating organizations: the company,
community organizations, environmental organizations
and labor unions. See Model Pnnciples, supra note 39. The
EPAs control over the GNA really only factors in when the
local industry does not complete the terms of the agree-
ment satisfactorily. See 1995 SEP Policy, 60 Fed. Reg. at
24,862. If performance is unsatisfactory, the EPA chooses
whether or not to impose stipulated penalties. See id.
155. See 1995 SEP Policy, 60 Fed. Reg. at 24,858.
156. See generally Model Pnnciples, supra note 39, at 1-3.
157 See id. Specifically, among the model principles
suggested by the Good Neighbor Prolect to be incorpo-
rated into or addressed in a legally binding GNA are the
following: (1) identification of participating organizations;
(2) selection of an audit oversight group; (3) selection of
an audit expert; (4) clarification of administrative aspects
such as funding and supervision; (5) definition of the
perform. 160 GNAs simply supplement the EPA's
regulatory functions. 61 That the EPA created
environmental databases and instituted public
environmental education programs evidences
the EPA's endorsement of the public's supple-
mental role in the regulatory process, 162 As
shown, a GNA adequately satisfies all of the
legal guidelines for a SEP
3. Categones of SEPs
The EPA specified the following seven cat-
egories of projects that qualify as SEPs (I)
public health, (2) pollution prevention, (3) pol-
lution reduction, (4) environmental restoration
and protection, (5) assessments and audits, (6)
environmental compliance promotion, and (7)
emergency planning and preparedness.163
Stakeholder audits form the main compo-
nent of GNAs.164 That component allows GNAs
to fall clearly within the assessments and
audits SEP category. Through the audits, stake-
holders audit the facility themselves or act as
an oversight group to the corporate audit. 161 In
the assessments and audits SEP category, a
stakeholder audit can be either (1) an environ-
mental management system audit, or (2) a
compliance audit 66 While the former focuses
on efficiency in the production process, the lat-
ter focuses on compliance with environmental
laws and regulations.
scope of audit; (6) maintenance of publk access to infor-
mation; (7) handling trade secrecy issues, (8) assurinces
of good faith implementation; and (9) incorporation of an
enforcement clause. See id
158. See 1995 SEP Policy, 60 Fed Reg at 24,858
159. See, EPA's FY 1996, supra note 12, at 3
160. See Moving Forward Toward Environmental
Excellence, supra note 38, at 6
161. Sec. id.
162. See EPAs FY 1996, supra note 12, at 3
163. See 1995 SEP Policy, 60 Fed REg at 24,858-860
164. See generallo Model Principles, supra note 30 at 1-3
165 See Moving Forward Toward Environmental
Excellence, supra note 38, at 12
166. See 1995 SEP Policy, 60 Fed REg at 24,850 it is
important to note that the stakeholder audit is intended
simply to be a starting block to negotiate for further com-
mitments from industry. See Feel Good Notions, supra note 45,
at 21-22.
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Using the information obtained from the
audits, stakeholders negotiate for commit-
ments from the local industry to engage in the
best practices "environmentally. safety-wise
and economically."167 Therefore, GNAs often
.lead to improvements in public health.' 68 pol-
lution preventioni 69 pollution reductioni70
environmental restoration and protection.i
7i
and emergency planning and preparedness.17
Thus, a GNA can easily be crafted to fit any one
of a number of SEP categories.
4. Calculating an Adequate Enforcement
Penalty
In calculating an enforcement penalty, the
EPA maintains three civil penalty policy objec-
tives: (1) deterrence, (2) equitable treatment of
the regulated community, and (3) immediate
resolution of environmental concerns,'
Generally, the enforcement penalty imposed
should exceed the economic benefit reaped
from violating the relevant environmental
statutes. 74 The calculation of both economic
benefit and gravity factors leads to deterrence
of both current violators and potential viola-
tors. 75 Consideration of economic benefit lev-
els the playing field for those in the regulated
community who have financially and signifi-
cantly invested in environmental compli-
ance.' 76 The EPA also takes into account sever-
al mitigation factors: (1) benefits to the public
167 See Feel Good Notions, supra note 45, at 21-22
168. See, e.g., Unocal Agreement, supra note 76, at I
Unocal agreed to pay for a medical clinic, See id.
169. See. e.g., Alcoa Agreement, supra note 62. at I
Alcoa agreed -to study 'zero discharge' wastewater treat-
ment technologies for discharge to Lavaca Bay. Id
170. See. e.g., Chevron Refinery Agreement, supra note
73, at 1. Chevron agreed to continue reducing toxic emis-
sions. See id.
171. See. e.g., Unocal agreement. supra note 76, at I
Unocal agreed to landscape and vegetate Unccal proper-
ty. See id.
172. See, e.g., Sun Oil Agreenment, supra note 69 at I
Sun Oil Company agreed to implement the Emergency
Notification System to warn the surrounding community
in the event of an accident. See id.
173. See Barnett Lawrence, Supplemental Envmroznmen-
tal Projects: A New Approach for EPA Enforcement, 26 Ei'rL. L
REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10.174. 10,175 (Apr 1996).
or environment at large, (2) innovation, (3)
environmental lustice, (4) multimedia impacts,
and (5) pollution prevention,177
GNAs, in effect, carry out the objectives of
civil penalties With stakeholder oversight, a
local industry is sufficiently deterred from fur-
ther noncompliance 178 Likewise, GNAs secure
redress from violators and offset the advan-
tages gained over nonviolators from the non-
compliance I-, For example, a GNA can include
a provision requiring the industry to make
investments equal to the economic benefit
attained from the violation, and this invest-
ment can be used to train those stakeholders
participating in the audit Such redress can
ensure the equitable treatment of the regulat-
ed community Also, stakeholders achieve
immediate resolution of environmental con-
cerns by obtaining enforceable commitments
from the local industry to rectify the environ-
mental problems '9 Hence, GNAs present an
alternative means of achieving the oblectives
of the EPA's civil penalty policy
GNAs exhibit all of the mitigating factors
the EPA will take into consideration when cal-
culating enforcement penalties.181 Further-
more, the possibility of one hundred percent
penalty mitigation arises if the SEP involves a
pollution prevention strategy. 12 Since the goal
of GNAs is zero toxics and zero discharge, a
local industry that enters a GNA with its stake-
174 See Interim Rev'isei EPA Supplemental
Env'ironmental Proie:ts POlici, 60 Fed Reg 24,856, 24,860
(19951 Ihereinafter 1995 SEP Pohcy[
175 See id Gravhty-based penalties are directly cor-
related to the degree of harm caused by the violating
industry The EPA le'.ies a penalty commensurate with the
need to deter violations of similar magnitude in the
future Theretcre the greater the harm to the community,
the more tthe penalttes vill have a deterrence value, r e
severe monetary' c nseuenzes for the violator
176 See r.
177 See d at 24 861
178 See Mng For'ard Toward Environmental
Excellence fupra note 38 at 12
179 See Mo-,nqi ForAard Through Evotution, supra note
43, at 6
180 See id
181 See Feel Geed Notions, supra note 45, 20-22
182 See 1995 SEP Policy, 60 Fed Reg at 24,861
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holders increases its chances of mitigating its
enforcement penalties by up to one hundred
percent. 183
5. Specifically Detailed Settlement
Agreements
The Good Neighbor Prolect for Sustainable
Industries publishes a guide providing specific
details for structuring GNAs.184 Incorporating
the provisions suggested by the organization
ensures that the GNA is sufficiently defined to
meet the EPA's requirement that a SEP be
specifically detailed in the settlement agree-
ment.
B. Other Enforcement Tools
While the focus of this Note is on GNA
SEPs, other potential regulatory vehicles exist
for implementing a GNA. Alternative enforce-
ment tools include Project XL and the
Environmental Leadership Program.
1. Project XL
Project XL185 is an effort by the EPA to
experiment with new strategies that provide
regulated entities with sufficient flexibility to
remain competitive in the market while also
ensuring better environmental results than
would have be attained under existing
approaches to environmental protection.
Among the pilot prolects that qualify under
Project XL are those that focus on community-
based reinvention efforts. 86 The success of
such projects centers on the collaboration
between community stakeholders, industry
and regulators in setting a common agenda. 87
The features of a GNA fall squarely within
the criteria considered by the EPA in selecting
183. See Feel Good Notions, supra note 45, at 21-22.
184. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
185. Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Proiects, 60
Fed. Reg. 27,282, 27,283 (1995).
186. See Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects.
XL Community Pilot Program, 60 Fed. Reg. 55,569, 55,569
(1995).
187. See id. at 55,570.
188. See id.
189. See id. Stakeholders negotiate with industry and
a pilot project. First, the EPA gives greater con-
sideration to proposals that receive the most
support from community stakeholders.i88
Building on the principles of oarticipatory
community planning and consensus-based
goals, GNAs are, therefore, likely to receive
widespread approval from the EPA. Second,
pilot projects must demonstrate a potential to
achieve "cleaner results."l8 9 Striving for best
practices such as pollution prevention, GNAs
exhibit the potential to attain environmentally
superior results. Third, pilot projects must
engage in a multi-media approach.0 0 Under-
lying most GNAs is the principle of holistic
content, which means that the GNA must
attempt a comprehensive multimedia ap-
proach to environmental problems. Finally, the
EPA requires that projects incorporate environ-
mental lustice goals within their agendas,i""
Through the empowerment of local stakehold-
ers in the decisionmaking process of local
industries, GNAs provide an effective tool to
advance the goals of environmental lustice.
GNAs qualify as pilot projects and could be
conducted within the Project XL scheme
2. Environmental Leadership Program
The Environmental Leadership Program
(ELP) 192 evolved from the desire to test new
and innovative compliance approaches such as
third-party auditing to ease the regulatory bur-
den on both industry and the regulatory agen-
cies. The incentive for industry to participate in
the ELP is a special recognition of those com-
panies exhibiting true nationa leadership
through their commitment in developing supe-
rior environmental management systems that
advance pollution prevention.,03 One factor in
regulators about what should constitute "cleaner results
190. See id,
191. See id.
192. Environmental Leadership Program, 58 Fed
Reg. 4802. 4805 (1993). Unlike Prolect XL, which permits
some degree of flexibility in exchange for the attainment
of environmentally superior results, pilot projects under
the Environmental Leadership Program (ELP) are
required to improve compliance within existing regulato-
ry requirements. See generally id
193. See 58 Fed. Reg, at 4802-03,
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the EPA's determination of the "best" company
is community involvement. 194 Companies are
strongly encouraged to permit community
involvement in the identification, implementa-
tion and evaluation of pollution prevention
practices.19
5
As such, GNAs provide the potential
means for a company to qualify under the ELP
In stressing the goals of pollution prevention
and local stakeholder involvement, GNAs meet
two primary requirements of ELP pilot pro-
jects. Local stakeholders can conduct the
third-party audits of the facilities and work with
the local industries to design environmentally
superior solutions that exhibit a commitment
to significantly improving the protection of the
environment and the public health. In return
for entering into GNAs and engaging in cre-
ative negotiations with local stakeholders that
produce concrete benefits, a local industry can
receive recognition from the EPA as a national
leader. The ELP, therefore, offers another
means for implementing the GNA alternative.
V. The GNA SEP Alternative: An
Opportunity for Reinventing Regulation
The GNA SEP alternative possesses the
potential to be implemented on the regulatory
level. Currently, when a violating company con-
ducts an audit as part of its SEP, no obligation
exists requiring the company to implement any
of the resulting audit recommendations.' %
Nonetheless, the company receives credit for
the SEP'97 GNAs, however, can provide the
necessary external accountability mechanism
in the SEP scheme. 98 Stakeholders can ensure
that the company implements the audit rec-
194. See id. at 4808.
195. See id.
196. See Interim Revised EPA Supplemental
Environmental Prolects Policy. 60 Fed. Reg. 24,856,24,860
(1995) [hereinafter 1995 SEP Policyl; Kaschak, supra note
106, at 480.
197. See id.
198. See Public Policy Analysis. supra note 117. at 1,
199. See Moving Forward Toward Environmental
Excellence, supra note 38. at 12.
200. See Lawrence, supra note 173. at 10.174,
ommendations produced from the negotia-
tions following the stakeholder audit.'9
Stakeholder participation in GNAs, therefore,
can bolster the EPAs use of SEPs as an effec-
tive enforcement tool.
A. Prospect for the GNA SEP
The future outlook of the GNA SEP alterna-
tive appears bright The expansive use of SEPs
by the EPA occurred in part from its increased
emphasis on environmental auditing and pol-
lution prevention, 2' Furthermore, the EPA
negotiated several settlements containing
innovative SEPs, which promoted environmen-
tal justice and encouraged community involve-
ment in industry's decisionmaking process.2 0
For example, the EPA entered into a settlement
agreement with Puerto Rico Electric Power
Authority (PREPA) in which PREPA agreed to
spend one million dollars to hire an indepen-
dent environmental review contractor to pro-
vide assistance to local community mem-
bers-252 The independent contractor kept the
community informed about the local industry s
compliance and provided training and inde-
pendent technical expetse 203 Therefore, the
EPA's changing attitude toward SEP goals
appears conducive to GNAs
There are many incentives to undertake a
GNA as a SEP despite the possibility that the
cost of implementation might exceed any
penalty mitigation allowed by the EPA. 204
Among the incentives are those associated with
EMSs and environmental audits25 Another is
the good will established with the EPA and the
public.26 Because GNAs include a considera-
tion of pollution prevention, the GNAs will also
likely minimize future compliance costs and
201 See Steven A Herman, Enforcement Helps Reakie
EPAs Commitment to Environmental Justice to Improve People5




204 See Growth Eipected in Program, supra note 120, at
205 See discussion supra Part III
206 See Zimmermann, supra note 121, at 3
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correspondingly minimize future violations. 207
Next, a local industry avoids the "potentially
substantial costs and risks associated with pro-
tracted litigation."20 8 Also, the local industry
and its stakeholders can work together to iden-
tify and correct inefficiencies in the production
process. In turn, the corrections produce cost-
effective improvements and make the company
more competitive.2 09  Moreover, resulting
expenditures potentially count as capital costs
subject to tax breaks.210 Finally, the possibility
of extra consideration in financial assistance
programs for industries participating in GNAs
provides another possible incentive.2 1i
The increased efficiency in the production
processes, cost-cutting improvements to its
facility, tax breaks and other monetary benefits
might generate too much economic benefit for
the local industry. The EPA disqualifies a SEP if
it results in a net positive cash flow.2 12 If, how-
ever, the local industry commits not to deduct
the SEP cost from its taxes, the GNA may exhib-
it the necessary net negative cash flow to qual-
ify as a SEP2 13 A GNA SEP, therefore, "can be a
win-win proposition for the public and alleged
violator."214
B. Obstacles to Widespread Use of GNA
SEPs
Legal obstacles still exist which might pre-
vent a GNA SEP from being a win-win proposi-
tion. Representative John Dingell (D-Mich.)
and the General Accounting Office (GAO) have
207 See id. at 3-4.
208. Quan B. Nghiem, Using Equitable Discretion to
Impose Supplemental Environmental Projects Under the Clean
Water Act, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AF. L. REv. 561, 566 (1997).
209. See id., Lawrence, supra note 173. at 10,181,
210. See Kaschak, supra note 124, at 474 n,76.
211. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 15A.4 (West 1997).
212. See Interim Revised EPA Supplemental
Environmental Projects Policy, 60 Fed. Reg. 24,856, 24,861
(1995) Ihereinafter 1995 SEP Policyl.
213. See id.
214. Precedents for Corporate-Community Compacts, supra
note 137, at 4.
215. See Lawrence, supra note 173, at 10,176,
216. See Nghiem, supra note 208, at 562.
217 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) (1994),
questioned the EPA's legal authority to even
enter into SEPs.215 This skepticism reflects the
legal history of SEPs, which is marred by exec-
utive and legislative resistance.216 The lan-
guage of the Miscellaneous Re:eipts Act
217
lies, in part, behind the resistance. The Act
requires "an official or agEnt of the
Government receiving money for the
Government from any source [to] deposit the
money in the Treasury as soon as; practicable
without deduction for any charge or claim."218
The EPA's exercise of discretion to use SEPs to
mitigate enforcement penalties seems to
undermine the purpose of the Act, which is to
maintain Congress' control over the public
purse.219
Another oblection arises when SEPs
appear to exceed redress of the actual viola-
tions and attempt to carry out other statutory
goals. This is especially true when penalties
are allegedly diverted from the Treasury to ben-
efit third parties.220 Third-party status raises
the possibility that no direct ccnnection or
actual injury resulting from the violation
exists.2 21 As a result, the EPA's use of SEPs cre-
ates the sense that it is attempting to circum-
vent its appropriations. 222
In response, the EPA stresses that SEPs are
not substitutes for penalties and that violating
industries must pay, at the minimrum, penal-
ties equivalent to the economic benefit reaped
from the violations. 223 Moreover, tl- e EPA draft-
ed the legal guidelines of the 1995 SEP Policy
218. Id.
219. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE DECISION, B-
247155 (July 7, 1992), available in 1992 WL 726317
220. See Steven A Herman, EPA's Revised
Supplemental Environmental Projects Policu Wil Produce More
Environmentally Beneficial Enforcement Settlements, 10 No 6
NAAG NAT*L ENV'rL. ENFORCEMENT J. 9, 9 (1995) [hereinafter
EPAs Revised Supplemental Environmental Projects Policul.
Third-party status can occur when the EPA brings a suit
against a violator, but those directly affectEd by the viola-
tor's effects on the environment are residents in the sur-
rounding community
221. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE DECISION, supra
note 219. at 726317.
222. See id.
223. See EPA's Revised Supplemental Environmental
Projects Policy, supra note 220, at 9-10,
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to address these objections. 224 Observance of
the required legal guidelines establishes the
EPAs legal authority to enter SEPs.22 5 The
nexus requirement ensures that a sufficient
relationship exists between the project and the
violation. 226 In fact, most stakeholders partici-
pate in a GNA SEP because they are directly
affected by the activities of local industries.2 -7
The other SEP requirements further limit the
EPA's ability to exceed its appropriations: (1)
the EPAs enforcement action is confined to the
objective of the statute at issue; (2) the EPA
can have no role in controlling or managing the
SEP funds; (3) the SEP must sufficiently out-
line its terms; and (4) the SEP may not involve
any obligations which the EPA is legally
required to carry out itself.228 The 1995 SEP
Policy, therefore, provides reasonable assur-
ances that the general rule against augmenta-
tion of appropriations will not be violated,229 If
anything, a GNA SEP allows "mitigation pro-
jects to put money back into the affected envi-
ronments rather than the general treasury."23 0
Furthermore, statutory provisions clearly
delegate authority to the EPA in determining
the amount of penalties to assess on the vio-
lating industry.23i The discretion stems from
the criteria the EPA is to consider in setting
penalties.232 Common to several environmen-
tal statutes is that the EPA must take into
account other factors or matters that justice may
require.233 This language allows the EPA consid-
erable discretion to include GNA SEPs in
224. See Nghiem, supra note 208, at 571,
225. See Interim Revised EPA Supplemental
Environmental Proiects Policy. 60 Fed. Reg, 24,856, 24.858
(1995) Ihereinafter 1995 SEP Policyl; see also discussion
infra Part IV.A.2.
226. See id.
227 See Moving Forward Toward Environmental
Excellence, supra note 38, at 15.
228. See EPA's Revised Supplemental Environmental
Projects Policy, supra note 220, at 9-10.
229. id.
230. Kaschak. supra note 124. at 466.
231. See Laune Droughton, Supplemental Environmen-
tal Projects: A Bargain for the Environment, 12 PACE ErnvrL L
REv. 789, 812 (1995).
232. See Lawrence, supra note 173. at 10,179,
enforcement settlements,234
One further objection to the use of the
GNA SEP alternative is that a SEP dilutes the
deterrent effect of enforcement actions.
235
Allowing the violating industry to propose and
craft its own SEP amounts to giving it the dis-
cretion to determine its own punishment 236
The participation of stakeholders in the GNA,
however, ensures that the violating industry
makes an effort to prevent future noncompli-
ance Furthermore, the required consent of all
participating stakeholders to a GNA rebuts the
argument that the violating industry exercises
sole discretion in its punishment237
Lack of technical assistance to local stake-
holders poses a practical obstacle to the suc-
cess of the GNA alternative In fiscal year 1996.
only 2 out of 347 of the EPA's enforcement
actions resulted in SEPs that included funded
technical assistance programs for local com-
munities.233 Stakeholder involvement in the
GNA process is hindered by the inability to
understand the technical issues_231
Nevertheless, reasons for optimism exist
First, stakeholders are aggressively and suc-
cessfully negotiating with local industry to
share resources and technical expertise to
ensure more equality in the negotiations
process 249 Second. in its recent policy recom-
mendations, the EPA recommended that
industry provide more information and finan-
cial and technical assistance to encourage
community driven strategic planning2 41
233 See CWA33 USC § 1319d, (gt3) 1994j, CAA
42 U S C § 74131e (19941, TSCA 15 U S C § 26151a)(2)(B)
(19941, EPCRA 42 USC § l1045ibllfC1 11994-
234 See Droughton, supra note 231, at 813
235 See Nghtem supra note 208, at 569
236 See id
237 See Feel Good Notions, supra note 45, at 26
238 See O FFrE OF EV3R:IR .NT AND.D C3MPLW.%
Assupv.CE. FY 1996 ENFORCEVE%.T AND COMPLIA :F
AcsScu.c .E Accoz#V'sHvsETs REPORT BI-74 1 19971
239 See Feel Good Notions, supra note 45, at 14
240 See Harris, supra note 20, at 708
241 See EwViFC %'EKTA. PFi'.TrE--_To% AzE;:, ", RE.r,:,T
TO THE PRESIETS CO:,LZL SUC - AINA9SE D-vELo:)mNT 16
(1996)
Sonq 1999 Gwd Reghbalowm&
Mononne F. Ad~offco Volume 5, Number 3
Hence, the changing dynamics between indus-
try, regulators and private citizens signal the
hopeful prospect of implementing the GNA
alternative on the regulatory level.
VII. Conclusion
GNAs are consistent with the objectives
advanced by the reinvention of regulation. The
scope of a stakeholder audit, at a minimum,
involves a consideration of opportunities for
pollution prevention.2 42 Therefore, GNAs are
an affirmative effort to comply with the nation's
pollution prevention policy.243 Also, GNAs
place critical importance on empowering those
citizens affected by the activities of local indus-
tries.244 GNAs provide a structure that allows
environmental and community group initia-
242. See Model Pnncaples, supra note 39, at 2.
243. See id.
244. See Feel Good Notions, supra note 45 at 18-20.
245. See id. at 25.
tives to offset the relative power of industry,24'
The two key reinvention objectives of pollution
prevention and environmental lustice are lust
the beginning of what GNAs can potentially
accomplish.
The innovative use of SEPs to implement
the GNA alternative on the regulatory level
merits serious consideration by regulators, It
creates working relationships between regula-
tors, industry, community groups and environ-
mental organizations while siriultaneously
bulwarking the enforceability of GNAs. These
changing dynamics, in turn, lay the foundation
for the reinvention of regulation. By reinvent-
ing regulations, environmentally superior solu-
tions can be designed that go beyond mere
compliance.
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